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CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
The following APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
is submitted in good faith and not for purpose of
delay.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF THE BILL OF PARTICULARS
WORKED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT
The

Court

of

Appeals'

"Memorandum

Decision"

expressly decides the "theft by deception" charge was
not proven. This is absolutely correct and on point.
However, the decision then finds the Defendant guilty
of the "attempted theft" charge. [Implicit in that
decision is the fact that the "telephone books" charge
is seemingly ignored, ostensibly on the basis that the
telephone

books

were

in

fact

set

out

distribution" to members of the public.

for

"free

[The free

distribution was correctly noted in a footnote to the
"Memorandum Decision" opinion.] Thus, in essence, the
Court of Appeals has reversed the trial court judge on
the "photographs" charge (i.e. "theft by deception")
and proceeded nevertheless to find the Defendant guilty
of the "attempted theft" charge involving the same
photographs.
In

responding

to

the

"bill

of

particulars"

argument, the "Memorandum Decision" mistakenly focuses
2

upon the "abuse of discretion" standard articulated in
State vs Swapp, 8 06 p. 2d 115 (Utah Court of Appeals
1991) . Although the "abuse of discretion" standard
might be applicable in most cases, the application of
that standard to the instant case is inappropriate for
the

following

reasons. The

"abuse

of

discretion"

standard is applicable in cases where the trial judge
is fully informed! In the instant situation, the trial
judge was AS MUCH CONFUSED as was the Defendant as to
the

true

nature

of

the

charges.

Thus,

in

this

situation, the better analysis is to focus upon what
has actually happened. [Furthermore, a reading of the
Swapp decision shows that the prosecution in that case
carefully

including

affidavit

its legal theory of the accused's guilt.

The

defense

was

not

the

filing

mislead.

Nor

of

a

was

12-page

there

an

opportunity for the "flip-flopping" of the charges and
the resultant

conviction, as has occurred

in the

instant case.] The problem is not, per se, one of
"notice" to the accused; rather, the problem involves
the "shifting target" approach of a vague charging
document, against which he cannot be

expected to

prepare an "adequate defense", because the charge keeps
moving
It

as evidenced by the Court's decision!
is

a

fundamental

3

principle

of

appellate

jurisprudence

that

the

appellate

court

does

not

necessarily "weigh" the evidence (as does the trier-offact), but merely reviews the evidence to insure that
just and proper results have been obtained. In the
instant decision, the Court of Appeals seemingly has
"weighed" the evidence on the "attempted theft" charge
and applied the same to the "photographs". This is
unfortunate

and

prejudicial

to

the

Defendant.

First, the Defendant has been found guilty of an
offense ("attempted theft" of the photographs) which
the trial court did not find him guilty of. Secondly,
the offense of "attempted theft" was so poorly and
improperly pleaded, it is debatable whether or not the
trial judge would have found the Defendant guilty of
that offense, had it been properly charged

which it

was not.
The material allegations in the Information merely
recite the phrasing contained in the statute. [It's a
verbatim recitation of the statutory text! No attempt
is even made to "personalize" the same to the Defendant
or to the alleged criminal conduct. The "attempted
theft" DOES NOT even contain the requisite statutory
text customarily used to allege an "attempt".] Items
such as (1) the property description and (2) the victim
(as owner of that property) are NOT identified.

4

Ifrid fhe Information been properly worded so as to
allege "attempted theft", the Information would have
contained

at least

two

"elements" of

the alleged

offense which are material to a conviction: namely,
that the Defendant (1) undertook a "substantial step"
toward the commission of the offense, AND (2) that the
Defendant's action (i.e. the "substantial step") was
"strongly corroborative of the actor's mental intent"
necessary for the consummation and/or commission of the
offense. Thus, the positioning of the photographs was
very, very material to the charge. However, the trial
court

was

apparently

not

thinking

about

the

photographs in the context of the "attempted theft"
charge; Judge Boyden was pre-occupied with the "theft
by deception". Thus, was Judge Boyden even cognizant of
the two elements (i.e. "substantial step" and "strongly
corroborative of actor's mental intent") insofar as
such related to the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom? We don't know. [Although trial judge's
are probably presumed to know the law in the cases
presented to them, we cannot safely indulge in that
presumption in this case. The Court of Appeals has, in
essence, ruled as a matter of law, that the "theft by
deception" charge cannot stand and that the evidence
would not support the conviction. But Judge Boyden was

5

firm

in her analysis

as to the

"deception" . She

incorrectly applied the law in that particular. Judge
Boyden was similarly in error on the "single criminal
episode" aspects of the dual convictions, now made moot
by the Court of Appeals decision. Could it not be said
that Judge Boyden

charged not only with applying the

law, but also carefully listening for the operative
facts

misapplied things in the "attempted theft"

case. She wasn't really listening for the nuances
associated

with

that

charge, because

she

was

so

intently focused upon the "deception" charge which she
thought referred to the photographs and she so found,
albeit incorrectly on the legal issue.
The Court of Appeals
decision

in a three-judge, unanimous

has now overruled Judge Boyden and has

properly set aside the "theft by deception" charge. But
the Court of Appeals has now applied
a more accurate term

"transferred" is

the "attempted theft" charge to

those same photographs!
Given AS MUCH JUDICIAL CONFUSION as there IS AND
WAS concerning this case and the evidentiary basis
needed for this conviction, can the Court of Appeals
say that the evidence is so compelling that it proves,
beyond a reasonable doubt", that the Defendant engaged
in a "substantial step" towards the commission of the

6

offense,

which

step

was

simultaneously

"strongly

corroborative" of the requisite mental state needed for
theft?

Since

the

trial

judge

didn't

make

that

determination (in the context of the "photographs"),
wouldn't it be better

jurisprudentially

to allow

the trial court (on remand) to make that decision?
The "bill of particulars" issue is NOT MERELY that
the accused is entitled to know what specific incident
is before the trial court; the Defendant was well aware
of the incident. THE ISSUE IS whether or not the
allegations

of

criminal

conduct

are

sufficiently

narrowed so that the accused can "prepare an adequate
defense". Given the flip-flop status of the case, who
can

say

that

differently,

the Defense would have
if

the

charged

done things

offenses

were

more

precisely pleaded? [The prosecutor of those offenses
who is not appellate counsel

will want the most

"loose" charging document possible: so as to preserve
the maximum number of options. In this case, it worked:
Judge Boyden "bought into" the "deception" charge, even
though that was not, theoretically, what the prosecutor
set out to prove

or at least told the Defendant the

prosecutor was attempting to prove! In this same vein,
the

Court

of

Appeals

has

succumbed

to

the

same

"looseness": the "Memorandum Decision" results in a

7

"guilty" verdict to the charge opposite to what the
trial court found!
Is it that difficult for the prosecution to spell
out

(1) the

specific

description

of

the property

alleged to have been stolen and (2) the "owner" of that
property? [West Valley City didn't want to assert that
it was the "owner" of the telephone books, because the
City wasn't!] Now, when the Court of Appeals has the
opportunity to set things straight, wouldn't it be
better to take this opportunity to set things straight
as far as the "bill of particulars" issue?
The vague, ambiguous "disclose nothing" allegations
which are merely
phrasing

the recitation

of

the

statutory

a prosecutorial practice already condemned

by judicial decision in the Bell case [770 P. 2d 100
(Utah Supreme Court 1988)]

ought not be condoned,

expressly or implicitly. Given the judicial confusion,
the

historic

"abuse

of

discretion"

standard

for

reviewing the trial court's decision is not adequate.
The

trial

court

was, ultimately,

as

confused

as

everyone due to the prosecution's willful failure to
provide the necessary information. That failure has
obviously worked to the prejudice of the accused.
The

prejudicial

effect

upon

illustrated further by this example:

8

the

accused

is

IF the charging document (information) had
expressly alleged
as was apparently the
prosecutions theory of guilt understood by
the trial judge
that the "attempted theft"
charge related to the "telephone books" which
were the property of "telephone book company",
would the Court of Appeals now be so inclined
to now find the Defendant "guilty" of
"attempted theft" of the "photographs" as
"property of the City"? I hope not!
The prejudice to the Defendant IS ESTABLISHED,
consistent with the standards articulated in Bell. [In
this vein, the fact that the Information is so VAGUELY
WORDED as to allow the flip-flopping of the conviction
by the Court of Appeals involves the Court of Appeals
in the very problem that the trial judge was involved
in

all to the accused's detriment!]
To have the Court of Appeals now "weigh" the

evidence, without hearing the actual live witnesses and
seeing their demeanor and ascertaining the nuances
within their testimony (the proof of the attempt is
couched in terms of "undertakes a substantial step
towards the commission of the offense" and that the
"substantial step" must be "strongly corroborative" of
the accused's guilty "intent" is error!
In this regard, it is the function of the Court of
Appeals to review the conviction to determine whether
or not there was sufficient evidence to support the
guilty verdict; it is NOT the function of the Court of
Appeals

as it has now done

to evaluate the evidence

to ascertain whether the accused is in fact guilty of
an offense which the trial judge didn't

find the

Defendant guilty of! This should be particularly the
case in a situation which focuses upon the accused's
"intent" (necessary for a "theft" or "attempted theft"
conviction)!
The case should be remanded for re-trial on the
properly-alleged "attempted theft" charge.
II
THE APPELLANTS "UTAH CONSTITUTION" CLAIMS
HAVE NOT BEEN DECIDED BY THE MCDONALD DECISION
The

Memorandum

incorrectly

Decision

seemingly

notes

that the trial court had decided that

incarceration was not going to be a sentencing option,
such having been "eliminated" at the trial court's
denial of the jury trial! That's what Judge Boyden
sort-of SAID (at the November trial, when the jury was
not called or empaneled). But that's NOT what Judge
Boyden DID

(at the December

14th

sentencing) . On

December 14th she sentenced the Defendant to "15 days
in jail" (on the "theft by deception" charge involving
the

photographs)

and

"5

days

in

jail"

(on

the

"attempted theft" charge, ostensibly involving the
telephone books). The execution of those jail terms was
suspended upon the Defendant's timely performance of
"80 hours"

of

"community

service".
10

[Although

the

breakdown of the "80 hours" is not shown on the written
document prepared by the Clerk of the Court, the
announced breakdown was 56 hours for the Class B "theft
by deception" charge (the photographs, now dismissed by
the Court of Appeals) and 24 hours on the "attempted
theft" charge (now applied by the Court of Appeals to
the photographs). No monetary fine was imposed.
A
The provisions of the Utah Constitution
10 AND 12 of Article I thereof

Sections

are absolutely clear:

the charged criminal defendant IS ENTITLED to a "jury
trial". The Defendant made timely written demand for a
"jury trial". The "jury trial" was scheduled, months
before the trial date! The trial court's own "daily
calendar" indicates the case (and other cases that same
day) were scheduled for "jury trial"! [At the time of
the denial, the trial court had before it TWO OFFENSES,
although arising out of the "same criminal episode",
for which the aggregate incarceration was NINE MONTHS!]
To now, in hindsight, say the accused was charged with
a federally-described "petty offense"
found in the Utah Constitution

a phrase not

is in error!

This Court should not countenance the denial of a
timely-filed jury demand, for an offense for which a
jury trial is statutorily warranted, merely because the

14

trial court doesn't want to call a jury. Furthermore,
the trial court judge ought not to be making those kind
of pre-trial inquiries as to the nature of the case
and/or

the

Defendant

criminal
before

the

background,
trial.

To

if
do

any,
so

of

the

unfairly

prejudices the Defendant!
The Utah Constitution may afford greater rights to
accused persons than are afforded rights under the
corresponding federal (national) Constitution. See, for
example, Durham, "Employing the Utah Constitution in
the Utah Courts", Utah Bar Journal, November 198 9, pp.
25-27. See also State vs Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
Supreme Court 1990) [holding (in a plurality opinion)
that automobiles are afforded a greater degree of
protection under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution than under the United States Constitution
(Fourth Amendment), which has almost exactly the same
wording!] . C.f. State vs Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah
Court of Appeals 1992) ["A fundamental departure from
the well-established law regarding inventory searches
. . . (if) based on the Utah Constitution, must come,
if at all, from the Utah Supreme Court." 844 P.2d at
] .
That the accused's right to a "jury trial" is
mentioned

in TWO

separate provisions

12

of

the Utah

Constitution is significant! The right is unqualified
and absolute!
B
In this same vein, the Court's reliance upon the
West Valley

City vs McDonald

decision

is grossly

misplaced. McDonald involved a traffic violation! The
trial judge reduced the charge to an "infraction", thus
precluding

per statute

the possibility of sentence

of incarceration. The Court of Appeals found such to be
permissible.

But

to

now

say

as

the

Decision does, implicitly and expressly

Memorandum

that McDonald

is precedent authority to deny the Appellant's claims
is wrong. First, because Judge Boyden DID IMPOSE a
sentence of incarceration! And secondly, because the
accused has an absolute "constitutional right" to have
a jury trial of this very important charge, which has
serious

personal

ramifications

(i.e.

employment,

veracity as a witness in future proceedings, etc.)
beyond whether or not he is incarcerated.
The McDonald decision affirmatively acknowledges
that the appellant therein DID NOT properly present the
"state constitutional claim" on appeal and the case was
not thus adjudicated thereunder. The Court of Appeals
ought not to cite to McDonald as authority to dispose
of the Appellant's "state constitution" claims which

13

have

properly

raised

"constitutional right"

and

preserved!

The

weighty

under the Utah Constitution

of a citizen's "right to a jury trial" was NOT DECIDED
in

the McDonald

decision.

Thus,

McDonald

is NOT

precedent for the summary disposition of Appellant's
claims, which should be more fully considered by the
Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
That

the

adjudicating

Court
the

of

Appeals,

while

"theft by deception"

correctly

charge, can

seemingly "transfer" the conviction to the "attempted
theft" charge contained within the Information shows
the necessity for the bill of particulars! That the
Court of Appeals has
"deception" charge

properly, in the context of the
overturned that conviction but

nevertheless flip-flopped the charges establishes the
judicial confusion of the case at hand. Obviously, the
"confidence" in the proceedings below "has been eroded"
such that a re-trial of the "attempted theft" charge is
warranted!
The Defendant has made a "credible argument" that
the results might have been different, had the "bill of
particulars"

(identifying

the

specific

items

of

property sought to have been stolen) been provided.
The prosecuting attorney has not met the

14

"shifted

burden" requirements imposed upon him of convincing the
appellate court was "harmless error". Bell, supra, and
Knight, supra.
McDonald did NOT adjudicate nor create case-law
precedent

for

Constitution"

the

disposition

of

claims of denial of right

the

"Utah

to a jury

trial. The Appellant's claims are valid and should be
more fully considered.
Following decision on the "jury trial" issue, the
case should be remanded

to the district

court

for

trial, with instructions that the court require the
prosecution to specifically identify the property which
is subject to the "attempted theft" charge.
Respectfully
2000.

submitted this 20th day of April,

Attorney for Appellant
JAMES WESTON DECKER
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed, firstclass postage prepaid, to Mr Elliot R Lawrence,
Attorney at Law, Office of the West Valley City
Attorney, 3600 South Constitution Boulevard, West
Valley City, Utah 84119, this 20th day of April, 2000.
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Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
Decker contends that the evidence adduced at trial was
insufficient to support his convictions of attempted theft and
theft by deception. We disagree that the evidence was
insufficient to support Decker's attempted theft conviction. The
evidence established that Decker removed some photographs from
the City's file and hid them between two telephone books.1
Decker then returned the file, minus the photographs. Decker
later picked up the telephone books and left the building,
unaware that City employees had retrieved the photographs while
he paid for some copies. These facts sufficiently support the
attempted theft conviction because they demonstrate that Decker
"engage[d] in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the
commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1999).
In other words, the evidence adequately established that Decker
attempted to "obtain [] or exercise [] unauthorized control over
the property of [the City] with a purpose to deprive [it]
thereof." Id. § 76-6-404.

1. Although not important to our analysis, the City apparently
provided the telephone books free to the public.

The evidence, however, was not sufficient to support the
conviction of theJ t by deception because Decker deceived no one
in his attempt to steal the photos. See State v. Jones, 657 P.2d
1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) (stating that "reliance by the victim
[upon the deception] is an element of the crime of theft by
deception"). The City employees saw Decker hide the photographs
and then retrieve*, them when Decker left for a moment. Thus, we
reverse Decker's theft by deception conviction because the
statute does not . nclude "situations where theft by deception
might have happened, but, because of the victim's lack of
reliance on the perpetrator's deception, did not occur." State
v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)."
Decker also tontends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a 1 ill cf particulars. "We will not reverse the
trial court's decision to deny a bill of particulars unless the
trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d
115, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In this case, Decker had the
following: the Information; the City's objection to his motion
wherein the City set out the facts that led to the charges; and
open access to the prosecution's file. Given all that the City
provided Decker, the trial court did not aibuse its discretion in
denying his request for a bill of particulars because it was
111
sufficient information "so that he [could] know the particulars
of the alleged wrcngful conduct and [could] adequately prepare
his defense."'" IcL_ at 117-18 (citations omitted).
Finally, Decker argues that the trial court erred in denying
his request for a jury trial. Because the charges against Decker
carried maximum prison terms of six months or less, Decker was
not entitled to a jury trial. See West Valley City v. McDonald,
948 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, "the trial
court agreed to eliminate jail time from its sentencing options,"
and therefore, "it no longer was required under Utah law to grant
[Decker's] request for a jury trial." Id. at 3^4.

2. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the theft by
deception conviction, we need not address Decker's argument that
the "single criminal episode" provision precludes prosecution of
multiple offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999).

990029-CA

2

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction of attempted theft and
reverse the conviction of theft by deception.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:

990029-CA
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